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This paper looks at structural change as one additional source of decline in the
wage share. First, we provide a decomposition of changes in aggregate wage shares into
changes due to variations in output composition and in sectoral wage shares for nine
OECD countries between 1977 and 2010. We show that the rise in the service sector
is a relevant factor in explaining the fall of the wage share, at least for some countries.
Next, we develop a two-sector Kaleckian growth model consisting of the service and
manufacturing sectors. We assume that structural change is exogenous as it arises from
a shift in consumersâ preferences or in the saving rate. We show that, when mark-ups
are relatively higher in the service sector, a shift in the sectoral composition of demand
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1 Introduction
At the onset of modern growth theory, Kaldor (1961) suggested that long-run stability of
factors income shares is one of the main ’stylized facts’ of market economies. Yet, recent con-
tributions (Jayadev and Rodriguez, 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; OECD, 2015)
have shown that the labor share has declined over the past three decades in both developed
and developing countries. While the possibility of short- and medium-run fluctuations in
factors shares has long been acknowledged (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Young, 2004),
the prolonged decline in labor share seems to point to either a long-run negative trend in
the labor share or a shift to a lower steady state wage share as more plausible descriptions
of the evidence.
Several explanations for such a trend have been put forward and investigated both from
theoretical and empirical standpoints. Economists working within the neoclassical frame-
work have emphasized the importance of the shape of production function and the nature of
technical change in determining factors shares trends. As is well known, a unitary elasticity
of substitution (σ) between capital and labor, that is a Cobb-Douglas production function,
necessarily implies constant factors shares. There are two possibilities to obtain a fall in
the labor share: either capital deepening (in efficiency terms) when labor and capital are
substitutes (σ > 1), or a reduction in the capital-labor ratio when the elasticity of substi-
tution is less than one. Piketty and Zucman (2014) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
support the first mechanism; Acemoglu (2003) analyzes the second possibility in the context
of induced technical change, though he only applies it to deviations from the stable steady
state wage share.
Other researchers (Berthold et al., 2002; Bental and Demougin, 2010; Checchi and
García-Peñalosa, 2010) have investigated the relation between changes in labor market in-
stitutions and the labor share trend. Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2010), in particular,
show that a reduction in unions’ bargaining power might have played a role in reducing the
share of income accruing to workers.
Multiple elements of globalization have also been singled out as factors behind the falling
labor share. They range from trade (Brock and Dobbelaere, 2006; Doan and Wan, 2017),
to offshoring (Elsby et al., 2013), to capital account openness (Jayadev, 2007).
Finally, economists working withing the Post-Keynesian tradition (Dünhaupt, 2017;
Stockhammer, 2017) have looked at the increasing size of the financial sector as an additional
determinant of the decline in the wage share.
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Relatively little attention, on the other hand, has been paid to the possible influence
of structural change on functional income distribution. De Serres et al. (2001) show that
changes in the sectoral structure of the economy help explaining the decline in the aggre-
gate wage share observed in five European countries and in the US over the 1980s and
1990s. From a theoretical point of view, a recent paper by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2018)
explains the decline in the labor share in a two sector neoclassical growth model, where
non-homothetic preferences and sectoral differences in productivities growth and factors’
elasticities of substitution produce an endogenous rise in the service sector relative to manu-
facturing. Their quantitative analysis shows that within-industries income shares dynamics
rather than changes in the sectoral composition of output is mostly responsible for the fall
in the aggregate wage share in the US. Pothier and Puy (2014) study the relation between
demand composition and inequality over the business cycle; they do not focus, however, on
long run changes in output composition and on the functional income distribution.
In this paper, we investigate the relation between changes in the composition of output
and the aggregate wage share. First, as an empirical motivation to our theoretical contri-
bution, we elaborate on the methodology and the evidence provided by De Serres et al.
(2001) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2018) to assess the effect of changes in the sectoral
composition of output on the wage share in nine OECD countries between 1977 and 2010.
We show that while changes in sectoral wage shares are the main driver of the fall in the
aggregate wage share, the rise in the service sector share of total value added still provides
a significant contribution to the trend, particularly in UK, Italy and Germany.
Next, we build on Dutt (1988) and Dutt (1990) to develop a two-sector Kaleckian model
of growth and distribution, where the economy consists of the service and manufacturing
sectors. The service good is only used for consumption while the manufacturing good is used
both for consumption and the accumulation of capital stock. We assume that structural
change is exogenous as it arises from shifts in consumers’ preferences and in the saving rate.
We study two versions of the model, with and without profit rates equalization across sector.
Under both specifications we show that, when mark-ups are relatively higher in the service
sector, a shift in the sectoral composition of demand in favor of the service sector generates
a rise in the steady state profit share. The unique (non-trivial) steady state equilibrium is
asymptotically stable. The crucial assumption that mark-ups are relatively higher in the
service sector is motivated by the empirical finding that wage shares in the manufacturing
sector are consistently higher than in the service sector.
While seminal contributions by Dutt (1988, 1990); Park (1995); Dutt (1997); Lavoie and
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Ramirez-Gaston (1997); Franke (2000) laid the foundations of the two-sectors Keynesian-
Kaleckian model of growth and distribution, recent papers have generalized the model to
investigate additional issues. Nishi (2018) analyzes the effects of introducing sectoral en-
dogenous labor productivity growth on cyclical demand, growth and distribution. Fujita
(2018) explores how changes in sectoral mark-ups affect sectoral and aggregate capacity
utilization and capital accumulation. Murakami (2018) studies the effect of sectoral inter-
actions on business cycles in a Keynesian model, without focusing on income distribution.
None of these recent contributions, however, consider the role that changes in consumers’
preferences and, in turn, in demand composition may produce on income distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the empirical motiva-
tion of the paper; Section 3 develops the model and states the theoretical results; Section 4
offers some concluding remarks while proofs of the propositions and the full description of
data can be found in Section 5.
2 Data and Empirical Motivation
Starting from the empirical evidence provided by De Serres et al. (2001) and Alvarez-
Cuadrado et al. (2018), we investigate the time series related to both aggregate and sectoral
wage shares and to structural change, that is the change in sectoral output over the total
value added, in order to assess the relevance of the sectoral shift from manufacturing to
service upon the declining pattern of the wage share.
We use the 35-sectors EU-KLEMS data (O’Mahony 2009) to build time series of aggregate
and sectoral wage shares and sectoral shares of total value added, from 1977 to 2010, for
nine advanced economies: US, UK, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France, Spain, Japan and
Austria.1 For each country, we compute the aggregate wage share (ω) as the ratio between
total industries labor compensation and value added, whereas sectoral wage shares have
been computed as sectoral labor compensations over sectoral value added. If we denote
sectors by i, aggregate and sectoral wage shares are related as follows:
ωt =
∑
i
ai,tωi,t, (1)
where i = m, s, r indicates the manufacturing, service and the other sectors included in
1See subsection 5.1 in the Appendix for a detailed description of the data.
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Country ∆ωs ∆ωm ∆ω ∆as ωm − ωs
US -0.06 -0.20 -0.09 0.15 0.10
UK 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.24 0.10
Germany -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.17 0.17
Italy -0.14 0.01 -0.1 0.20 0.10
Netherlands -0.12 -0.1 -0.10 0.16 0.01
France -0.13 -0.1 -0.14 0.18 0.08
Spain -0.09 0.01 -0.09 0.22 -0.01
Japan -0.20 -0.02 -0.13 0.15 0.01
Austria -0.11 -0.16 -0.12 0.15 0.10
Table 1: Changes in wage shares and service sector weights by country (1977-2010).
our analysis, and ai is the ith sectoral weight, or sectoral shares of total value added.2
We perform our empirical analysis by using the trend component of both aggregate and
sectoral wage shares and sectoral weights, obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter
to our time series.3 In table 1 we report for each country the change in the trend component
of the aggregate (∆ω) and sectoral (∆ωs and ∆ωm) wage shares, of the service sector weight
over the total value added (∆as), and the difference between the average manufacturing and
service sector wage share (ωm − ωs) from 1977 to 2010.4 For all countries, we observe a
decrease in aggregate wage share and an increase in the service sector output share of total
value added, that is a sectoral shift towards services. The picture regarding changes in
sectoral wage shares is more nuanced. In the service sector there is a substantial decline
of the wage share in all countries save for UK, where it barely rises. The manufacturing
wage share, on the other hand, does not fall in Italy, Spain, and UK, while it drops in all
other countries, Austria and US in particular. Additionally, we report a positive difference
between the average wage share in manufacturing and in service sector for all countries
except for Spain, thus providing empirical support for our hypothesis (see subsection 3.1)
about higher mark-ups in the service sector.
Our goal is to quantify how changes in the sectoral composition of the economy contribute
to the decline in the aggregate wage share. To the purpose, we follow De Serres et al. (2001)
2The Appendix provides a detailed description of the sectors included following the EU-Klems classifica-
tion.
3We set the parameter λ of the HP filter to 6.25, as indicated by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data.
Moreover, as a robustness check we also perform our analysis by applying a Band Pass filter to our time
series (Baxter and King 1999 and Christiano and Fitzgerald 2003). The results are available upon request.
4The data related to UK and Japan refer to the period 1977-2009.
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and differentiate equation (3.1) to find the following decomposition:
∆ωt =
∑
i
ωi,t∆ai,t +
∑
i
ai,t−1∆ωi,tai,t. (2)
At any point in time, the change in the aggregate wage share equals the sum of changes
due to variations in the composition of output and in sectoral wage shares. Differently from
De Serres et al. (2001), we do not perform a sub-sample change analysis because, given the
relatively high variation of the components reported in equation (2), results would be highly
sensitive to the sub-sample starting and ending values interval. Therefore, we perform the
decomposition over the whole sample. Moreover, we use the trend component of both sec-
toral weights and wage shares to make our conclusions unaffected by the highly cyclical
behavior of the time series involved. On the other hand, our computation of the influence
of structural change on wage share changes differs from Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2018).
While they calculate it by assuming sectoral wage shares fixed at their average value over
the sample, the use of equation (2) let us take changes in sectoral wage shares into account.
Figure 1: Decomposition of changes in the aggregate wage share
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Country Sectoral reallocation Variation of sectoral wage shares
US 0.07 0.93
UK 0.62 0.38
Germany 0.29 0.71
Italy 0.31 0.69
Netherlands 0.07 0.93
France 0.13 0.87
Spain 0.03 0.97
Japan 0.20 0.80
Austria 0.12 0.88
Table 2: Decomposition of the effect of sectoral reallocation and within sectors wage share
variation upon the pattern of aggregate wage share (1977-2010).
Figure 1 and Table 2 summarize our findings. They clearly show that the fall in the
aggregate wage share is mostly due to variations in sectoral wage shares. Still, at least
for UK, Italy and Germany the rise in the service sector share of value added cannot be
dismissed as a relevant source of change in income distribution as it explains close to or
more than 30% of the overall reduction in the wage share.
3 The Model
3.1 Production and technology
The economy consists of the service good and the manufacturing good. Output in both
sectors (Xi) is produced through a sector-specific Leontief production function:
Xi = min[uiBiKi, AiLi], i = s,m (3)
where B and A are capital and labor productivities, K is the capital stock, L is em-
ployment, and u is the degree of capacity utilization. We assume no depreciation of capital.
Profit maximization ensures:
Xi = uiBiKi = AiLi. (4)
Since we do not consider changes in capital productivities and no particular insights can
be learned from their heterogeneity, without loss of generality we assume Bi = B = 1 to
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keep our notation more parsimonious.
3.2 Society and preferences
There are two classes in society. Workers supply labor services inelastically and receive the
wage rate w, uniform across sectors. They consume their whole income. Capitalists earn
profits on the capital stock they own. Their propensity to save is s > 0.5 Workers and
capitalists share the same preferences, which are defined over the two goods. We assume
that individual utility of agent j is:
Uj(cs, cm) = min[cs, αcm],
where ci is consumption of good i, and α > 0. The fixed coefficient structure of prefer-
ences implies cs = αcm. The same fixed proportion carries over to total demand:
Cs ≡
∑
j
cs =
∑
j
αcm = α
∑
j
cm ≡ αCm. (5)
The assumption of Leontief utility function (zero elasticity of substitution between con-
sumption goods) may appear restrictive, but we consider it appropriate in order to portray
a shift in demand composition. In any case, in section (3.8) we generalize the preferences
structure to any finite value of elasticity of substitution, and show that our conclusions carry
over to the general framework.
3.3 Mark-up prices
In line with the original Kaleckian literature, we assume that firms set prices by charging
a constant mark-up (zi) over unit labor cost. Mark-ups are sector specific and our crucial
hypothesis is that they are relatively higher in the service sector. The evidence reported
in Table 1 justifies the assumption, as the wage share in the manufacturing sector is on
average higher than the one in the service sector for all countries but Spain. If we let pi
be the price of good i, and we choose the service sector good as the numeraire we have
ps = 1 = (1 + zs)w/As and pm ≡ p = (1 + zm)w/Am, with zs > zm. Accordingly
w =
As
1 + zs
, (6)
5We denote by s both the service sector and the saving rate. Given context no ambiguity should arise.
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p =
1 + zm
1 + zs
As
Am
≡ 1 + zm
1 + zs
γ. (7)
3.4 Value added distribution
In each sector, value added is distributed as wages and profits to labor and capital employed
in production. If we let ri be the interest rate in sector i we have piXi = wLi + ripmKi,
which, after using (4), (6), (7) and rearranging, yields
rs =
zs
1 + zm
1
γ
us, (8)
and
rm =
zm
1 + zm
um. (9)
3.5 Output uses
The service good is only used for consumption so that Xs = Cs. In what follows, it will be
useful to distinguish consumption depending on its income source. We denote consumption
out of wages as Cwi , and consumption out of profits as C
pi
i , so that
Xs = Cs = C
w
s + C
pi
s . (10)
Manufacturing output, on the contrary is used both for consumption and for investment (I)
in the service and in the manufacturing sectors:
Xm = Cm + I. (11)
3.6 Balanced growth under alternative closures
The discussion between Park (1995) and Dutt (1997) on the risk of over-determination
in the Kaleckian two sector growth model clarified that there are two possible consistent
specifications of the model. In the first one, there is no sectoral capital mobility in the short
run, so that Ks and Km are given; we can specify sectoral growth rates, and profit rates
will not be equalized unless by a fluke. The second version of the model assumes that the
stock of capital moves between sectors to equate sectoral profit rates in the short run; in
this framework, since the sectoral capital stocks are not state variables we can only specify
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the aggregate growth rate, rather than the sectoral ones.6 We analyze the two specifications
of the model in turn, and we show that the qualitative results on income distribution and
structural change are independent of the model closure.
3.6.1 The model without profit rates equalization
Since workers do not save, the whole wage fund is spent as consumption out of wages. Using
(5) and (4) we have
Cwm + C
w
s = C
w
s /α+ C
w
s = w(Ls + Lm) = w
(
usKs
As
+
umKm
Am
)
.
Hence, factorizing Cws and substituting for the wage rate from (6) yields
Cws =
α
1 + α
As
1 + zs
(
usKs
As
+
umKm
Am
)
=
α
1 + α
1
1 + zs
(usKs + γumKm) . (12)
On the other hand, capitalists’ propensity to consume out of profits is (1−s). Accordingly
Cpim + C
pi
s = C
pi
s /α+ C
pi
s = (1− s) (rmpKm + rspKs) ,
which, using (7),(8) and (9) implies
Cpis =
α
1 + α
1− s
1 + zs
(zsusKs + zmγumKm) .
Once we know consumption out of wages and profits in the service sector, we can use
equation (10) to find
Xs =
α
1 + α
1
1 + zs
(usKs(1 + (1− s)zs) + γumKm(1 + (1− s)zm)) .
Define δ ≡ Ks/K ∈ [0, 1] as the share of the capital stock employed in the service sector.
Dividing both sides of the previous equation by K and rearranging yields
δus = (1− δ)umγα(1 + (1− s)zm)
1 + zs(1 + αs)
≡ (1− δ)umγΓ(α, s). (13)
It is easy to show that Γ is a positive function of α and negative function of s, when zs > zm.
6A variant of this version of the model assumes that profit rates equalization is a slow process. Sectoral
capital stocks are given and sectoral investment depends on the profit rates differential. We explore this
variant in the stability analysis.
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Let us now turn to the equilibrium in the manufacturing sector. If we let gi be the growth
rate of sector i, under the assumption of no sectoral capital mobility, equation (11) becomes
Xm = Cs/α + gmKm + gsKs = Xs/α + gmKm + gsKs, where we used (5). Using factors
demands found in (4), and dividing both sides by K, the previous condition becomes
um(1− δ) = usδ/α+ gm(1− δ) + gsδ. (14)
The Kaleckian tradition posits that investment depends on utilization of capacity as a
measure of aggregate demand. In our case, the actual growth rate of capital in each sector
is a function of the sector’s degree of capacity utilization:
gm = gm(um), (15)
and
gs = gs(us). (16)
Finally, balanced growth requires that sectoral growth rates be equalized
gm = gs. (17)
We have a consistent system of five equations, (13),(14),(15),(16) and 17, in the five
unknowns δ, um, us, gm, gs. Our focus is on income distribution. The profit share pi is the
ratio between the value of total profits and value added. We can use (4), (7), (8), (9), (13)
to calculate its equilibrium value
pi∗ =
rspKs + rmpKm
Xs + pXm
= p
rsδ + rm(1− δ)
δus + (1− δ)pum =
p
1 + zm
usδ/γ + zmum(1− δ)
δus + (1− δ)pum =
zsΓ(α, s) + zm
(1 + zs)Γ(α, s) + (1 + zm)
. (18)
Inspection of (18) shows that pi∗ is economically meaningful being bounded between zero
and one. It is a function of the sectoral mark-ups, consumers’ preferences between the two
consumption goods, and the saving rate.
We are now able to state:
Proposition 1. an increase in consumption demand of the service good relative to the
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manufacturing good (a rise in α) raises the equilibrium profit share.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2. a decrease in the saving rate raises the equilibrium profit share.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In both Proposition 1 and 2 the rise in the profit share follows the increase in Γ due to
shocks to α and s. In order to understand the economic meaning of an increase in Γ we can
re-write equation (13) as Xs/(Xmγ) = Ls/Lm = Γ(α, s). When Γ rises, employment in the
service sector rises relative to the manufacturing one. Given labor productivities and sectoral
mark-ups, the change in relative employment carries over to relative sectoral value added.
Therefore, the increase in the profit share depends on the change in the composition of
production in favor of the sector with higher mark-up, which can be caused either by a change
in consumers’ preferences or by a reduction in the saving rate. Contrary to the standard one
sector Kaleckian growth model, the profit share depends on savings. The intuition for the
influence of the saving rate on the composition of output is the following. The reduction in
the saving rate increases capitalists’ consumption, raising both service and manufacturing
consumption according to the constant proportion α. However, since manufacturing is used
both as consumption and as investment while service output is wholly consumed, the increase
in consumption of both sectors weighs relatively less in manufacturing and the composition
of output changes in favor of the service sector.
3.6.2 The model with profit rates equalization
In the second version of the model, sectoral capital stocks are not state variables since capital
adjusts in the short run to ensure profit rates equalization. Accordingly, there are no sectoral
growth rates and we need to replace equation (14) with
um(1− δ) = usδ/α+ g. (19)
Equation (13) is not affected by the new closure, whereas we need to drop (15) and
(16) and replace them with a single equation for the growth rate of capital. We assume it
depends on the degree of capacity utilization in both sectors:
g = g(us,um). (20)
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Next, we impose the equalization of profit rates across sectors, so that rs = rm. Using (8)
and (9), the equalization yields:
us = γ
zm
zs
um. (21)
We now have a consistent system of four equations, (13),(19),(20) and (21), in the four
unknowns δ, um, us, g. In particular, use (21) into (13) to find
δ∗ =
Γ(α, s)
Γ(α, s) + zm/zs
∈ (0, 1). (22)
Let us now turn to the profit share:
pi∗ =
rspKs + rmpKm
Xs + pXm
=
rp
δus + (1− δ)pum =
=
zm
(1− δ) ((1 + zs) Γ(α, s) + 1 + zm) =
zsΓ(α, s) + zm
(1 + zs)Γ(α, s) + (1 + zm)
, (23)
where we used the equalization of profit rates, (4), (7), (8), (9), (13), and (22). Equations
(15) and (23) show that the final expression for the profit share is the same irrespective of
the model closure; therefore, a shift of consumers’ preferences in favor of the service sector
and a decrease in the saving rate bring about an increase in the profit share, whether we
assume profit rates equalization or not.
3.7 Stability
We now turn to the stability analysis of the balanced growth path. In the model with profit
rate equalization, however, the adjustment to the balanced growth equilibrium is instanta-
neous and there is no transitional dynamics. In order to introduce a dynamic adjustment
in this version of the model, we assume that sectoral profit rates are different in the short
run, but changes in sectoral investment bring about profit rates equalization in the long run.
This is the process known as ’classical competition’. After this modification, the dynamics
of the economy in both models is described by the slow adjustment in the the allocation of
capital between sectors. To the purpose, we derive a differential equation for δ, the share of
capital employed in the service sector. Given the definition of δ, taking time derivative and
rearranging yields
13
δ˙ = δ(1− δ)(gs − gm). (24)
3.7.1 The model without profit rate equalization
In order to study the dynamic behavior of δ, we start by assuming explicit functional forms
for sectoral growth rates. Equations (15) and (16) become
gs = ϑ0 + ϑ1us (25)
and
gm = β0 + β1um. (26)
We can use the two previous equations together with (13) and (14) to solve for utilization
rates as functions of δ :
us(δ) =
γΓ(α, s)
Θ
(
β0
1− δ
δ
+ ϑ0
)
(27)
and
um(δ) =
(
β0 + ϑ0
δ
1− δ
)
/Θ, (28)
where Θ = [1− (β1 + γΓ(α, s)(ϑ1 + 1/α))]. Notice that economically meaningful (pos-
itive) solutions for um and us require Θ > 0, that is (β1 + γΓ(α, s)(ϑ1 + 1/α)) < 1. This
condition is the equivalent of the standard Keynesian ’stability’ condition in one-sector
Kaleckian growth models, which states that investment need be less responsive than saving
to economic activity. β1 and ϑ1 represent how sectoral investment reacts to capacity uti-
lization; the role of saving is captured by Γ(α, s), which is a negative function of the saving
rate.
We can rewrite (24) as
δ˙ = δ(1− δ) [gs(δ)− gm(δ)] ,
and state
Proposition 3. The system has two locally unstable trivial steady states at δ = 0 and δ = 1.
The system has one non-trivial steady state δ∗, which is asymptotically stable for δ ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. see the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that if the initial condition of the system is such that both sector
exist, the economy will converge towards the non- trivial steady state. If, on the other hand,
the economy consists of only one sector at the beginning of time, the two-sector structure
will never appear. Notice, however, that δ = 1 does not have economic meaning because
there cannot be accumulation of capital without production of the manufacturing good.
When δ = 0, on the other hand, we are back to the standard one-sector model, where the
only output is used for both consumption and investment.
3.7.2 The model with profit rates equalization
In order to introduce a dynamic adjustment in this version of the model, we assume that
profit rates equalization is not instantaneous. Sectoral profit rates are different in the short
run, but changes in sectoral investment bring about profit rates equalization in the long run.
We follow Dutt (1997) in assuming that the difference in sectoral growth rates depends on
the profit rates differential
gs − gm = λ(rs − rm), λ > 0. (29)
On the other hand, firms choose the total rate of investment based on the average degree
of capacity utilization in the economy u¯. Assuming a linear form for the investment function
we have:
g = g(u¯) = µ0 + µ1u¯, (30)
where
u¯ =
Xs + pXm
pK
=
1 + zm
1 + zs
usδ
γ
+ um(1− δ)Bm.
We can now use (13), (19), (8), (9) and (30) to solve for sectoral profit rates as functions
of δ :
rs(δ) =
zs
1 + zm
1
γ
us(δ) =
zs
1 + zm
µ0
Ψ
1
δ
, (31)
and
rm(δ) =
zm
1 + zm
um(δ) =
zm
1 + zm
µ0
Ψ
1
1− δ , (32)
where Ψ =
[
1− γΓ(α, s)/α− µ1
(
1 + 1+zm1+zs Γ(α, s)
)]
. Economically meaningful (posi-
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tive) solutions for rm and rs require Ψ > 0. Similarly to the previous case, we can interpret
it as the equivalent of the standard Keynesian ’stability’ condition in one-sector Kaleckian
growth models. Using the latest results and (29) in (24) we find
δ˙ = λδ(1− δ) [rs(δ)− rm(δ)] . (33)
We can state
Proposition 4. The system has two locally unstable trivial steady states at δ = 0 and δ = 1.
The non trivial steady state δ∗ = Γ(α,s)Γ(α,s)+zm/zs is asymptotically stable over δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Similarly to the comparative dynamics results found in Section 3.6, the comparison
between Proposition 3 and 4 show that the stability properties of the model are independent
of the model closure.
3.8 A generalization: the model with CES utility function
In this section we release the assumption of zero elasticity of substitution between consump-
tion goods. To the purpose, assume that the utility function of agent j is of the constant
elasticity of substitution type:
Uj(cs, cm) = [(1− υ)cρs + υcρm]
1
ρ ,
where υ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that measures the relative utility weight of the two goods
and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) regulates their elasticity of substitution, with σ = 1/(1− ρ).
From the first order conditions of the consumer utility maximization problem we have
∂U
∂cm
/
∂U
∂cs
=
υ
1− υ
(
cs
cm
)1−ρ
=
pm
ps
= γ
1 + zm
1 + zs
.
Hence,
cs =
(
1− υ
υ
γ
1 + zm
1 + zs
) 1
1−ρ
cm ≡
(
α˜γ
1 + zm
1 + zs
)σ
cm
By summing individual demands over all consumers, we obtain the proportion between total
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demands of the two goods:
Cs ≡
∑
j
cs =
∑
j
(
α˜γ
1 + zm
1 + zs
)σ
cm =
(
α˜γ
1 + zm
1 + zs
)σ∑
j
cm ≡
(
α˜γ
1 + zm
1 + zs
)σ
Cm. (34)
Notice that α˜ measures consumers’ relative preference for the service good. Not surprisingly,
an increase in α˜ raises the economy’s service to manufacturing goods ratio.
Using (34) and (4) we have
Cwm + C
w
s = C
w
s /
(
α˜γ
1 + zm
1 + zs
)σ
+ Cws = w(Ls + Lm) = w
(
usKs
As
+
umKm
Am
)
.
Hence, factorizing Cws and substituting for the wage rate from (6) yields
Cws =
(α˜γ)σ(1 + zm)
σ
(1 + zs)σ + (α˜γ)σ(1 + zm)σ
1
1 + zs
(usKs + γumKm) ≡ Λ
1 + zs
(usKs + γumKm) .
(35)
Similarly, using (34) in Cpim + Cpis = (1 − s)Π and proceeding as in subsection 3.6.1 we can
find
Cpis =
(1− s)Λ
1 + zs
(zsusKs + γzmumKm) .
Plugging the new solutions for Cpis and Cws in (10) and rearranging we obtain
δus = (1− δ)umγ Λ(1 + (1− s)zm)
1 + zs − Λ(1 + (1− s)zs) ≡ (1− δ)umγΓ˜(α˜, s). (36)
We can now use (4), (7), (8), (9) and (36) to find the equilibrium profit share as
pi∗ =
zsΓ˜(α˜, s) + zm
(1 + zs)Γ˜(α˜, s) + (1 + zm)
.
Since dpi∗/dα˜ = (zs−zm)Γ˜
′
α˜(α˜,s)
((1+zs)Γ˜(α˜,s)+(1+zm)γ)
2 , and dpi∗/ds =
(zs−zm)Γ˜′s(α˜,s)
((1+zs)Γ˜(α˜,s)+(1+zm)γ)
2 ,the profit share
rises: after a preference shift in favor of the service good if Γ˜′α˜(α˜, s) > 0, after a decrease in
the saving rate if Γ˜′s(α˜, s) < 0. We can use the definition of Λ to re-write Γ˜ as
Γ˜ = (α˜γ)
σ(1+zm)σ
(1+zs)σ+(α˜γ)σ(1+zm)σ
(1+(1−s)zm)
1+zs−(1+(1−s)zs) (α˜γ)σ(1+zm)σ(1+zs)σ+(α˜γ)σ(1+zm)σ
= (α˜γ)
σ(1+zm)σ(1+(1−s)zm)
(1+zs)σ+1+szs(α˜γ)σ(1+zm)σ
.
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Whence, Γ˜′α˜ =
γσ(1+zm)σ(1+(1−s)zm)σασ−1(1+zs)σ+1
((1+zs)σ+1+szs(α˜γ)σ(1+zm)σ)
2 > 0,
and Γ˜′s = −
(α˜γ)σ(1+zm)σ((α˜γ)σzs(1+zm)σ+1+zm(1+zs)σ+1)
((1+zs)σ+1+szs(α˜γ)σ(1+zm)σ)
2 < 0. Therefore, results obtained in
Proposition 1 and 2 are robust to the preferences generalization.
We have carried out the generalization within the framework of the model without profit
rates equalization. If we use (36) instead of (13) to solve for the steady state income
distribution in the model with profit rates equalization, it is easy to show that the equilibrium
profit share is identical under both closures of the model. Therefore the results obtained in
this subsection hold also for the model with profit rates equalization.
4 Conclusions
Evidence on the process of structural change shows that the service sector share in the
economy tends to rise as countries become richer (Herrendorf et al., 2014). If the wage
share in the service sector is relatively low, growth and structural transformation in mature
economies necessarily bring about a reduction in the aggregate wage share, absent mitigating
factors. As a consequence, changes in the composition of output and employment across
sectors should be taken into account when investigating the ongoing negative trend in the
wage share in most industrialized countries.
This paper has analyzed this mechanism from both an empirical and a theoretical stand-
point. First, we have provided a quantitative assessment of how empirically relevant the rise
in the service sector is in explaining the decline in the wage share in nine OECD countries.
While variations in sectoral wage shares are clearly the main driver of the fall in aggregate
wage shares, we have shown that the sectoral reallocation channel still matters to explain
the wage share dynamics, particularly in UK, Italy and Germany. Second, we have devel-
oped a two-sector Kaleckian model of growth and distribution, where the economy consists
of the service and manufacturing sectors. Shocks to consumers’ preferences or to the saving
rate that change the sectoral composition of demand in favor of the service sector generate
a rise in the steady state profit share. The unique (non-trivial) balanced growth path is
asymptotically stable.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Data
We use the EU-KLEMS 2012 release in ISIC Rev.4 (NACE 2) available at https://www.
euklems.net/. Following the EU-KLEMS sectoral classification, we construct manufactur-
ing sector (C) so to include: food products, beverages and tobacco (10-12), textiles, wearing
apparel, leather and related products (13-15), wood and paper products; printing and re-
production of recorded media (16-18), coke and refined petroleum products (19), chemicals
and chemical products (20-21), rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic min-
eral products (22-23), basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and
equipment (24-25), electrical and optical equipment (26-27), machinery and equipment (28),
transport equipment (29-30) and other manufacturing, repair and installation of machinery
and equipment (31-33).
We include in service sectors the following: wholesale and retail trade (G), transportation
and storage (H), accommodation and food service activities (I), information and commu-
nication (J), financial and insurance activities (K), real estate activities (L), professional,
scientific, technical, administrative and support service activities (M-N) and arts, entertain-
ment, recreation and other service activities (R-S).
We compute total industries value added and labor compensation by taking into account, to-
gether with manufacturing and service, also agriculture, forestry and fishing (A), mining and
quarrying (B), electricity, gas and water supply (D-E) and construction (F). These sectors
are also considered within the ‘residual ’ component of the decomposition analysis presented
in section 2. Community social and personal service (O-Q) and activities of households as
employers (T) are excluded from our analysis.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
dpi∗
dα
=
(zs − zm)Γ′α(α, s)
((1 + zs)Γ(α, s) + (1 + zm)γ)
2 > 0,
since zs > z and Γ′α(α, s) =
α(1+(1−s)zm)(1+zs)
(1+zs(1+αs))
2 > 0.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
dpi∗
ds
=
(zs − zm)Γ′s(α, s)
((1 + zs)Γ(α, s) + (1 + zm)γ)
2 < 0,
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since zs > z and Γ′s(α, s) =
−α(zm+αzs+zmzs(1+α))
(1+zs(1+αs))
2 < 0.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us start with the two trivial steady states. Inspection of (24) shows that δ˙ = 0 at δ = 0,
and δ = 1. Turning to stability, we have dδ˙dδ = (1−δ) [gs(δ)− gm(δ)]−δ [gs(δ)− gm(δ)]+δ(1−
δ) [g′s(δ)− g′m(δ)] . At δ = 0, gs(0) is not defined but limδ→0 dδ˙dδ = limδ→0 [gs(δ)− gm(δ)]→
∞ > 0, so that the first trivial steady state is locally unstable. At δ = 1, gm(1) is not defined
but limδ→1 dδ˙dδ = limδ→1 − [gs(δ)− gm(δ)]→∞ > 0, so that the second trivial steady state
is locally unstable.Let us now to turn to prove the existence and stability of the non-trivial
steady state. Plug 27 and (28) into (24) to find
δ˙ = δ(1− δ)
[
ϑ0 + ϑ1
γΓ(α,s)
BsΘ
(
β0
1−δ
δ + ϑ0
)− β0 − β1 (β0 + ϑ0 δ1−δ) /Θ]
= δ(1− δ)
[
ϑ0 − β0 + ϑ1 γΓ(α,s)BsΘ ϑ0 − β1β0/Θ
]
+(1− δ)2ϑ1 γΓ(α,s)BsΘ β0 − δ2β1ϑ0/Θ
= δ2(K2 −K1 −K3) + δ(K1 − 2K2) +K2, where K1 = ϑ0 − β0 + ϑ1 γΓ(α,s)BsΘ ϑ0 − β1β0/Θ,
K2 = ϑ1
γΓ(α,s)
BsΘ
β0, and K3 = β1ϑ0/Θ. Therefore δ˙(δ) is a quadratic function. As a first step,
notice that δ˙(0) = K2 > 0, and δ˙(1) = −K3 < 0. Since δ˙ is continuous, over the domain
δ ∈ [0, 1], it must cross the horizontal axis from above at least once in order to move from
positive to negative values, according to Bolzano’s theorem for continuous functions defined
over a compact set. In principle, there could be a second root since the function is quadratic,
but that cannot be the case or there would need to be a third real root for the function to
approach a negative value as δ → 1. Therefore, for δ ∈ (0, 1) there can only be one steady
state δ∗. It is asymptotically stable as δ˙ < 0 for δ > δ∗ and δ˙ > 0 for δ < δ∗.
5.5 Proof of proposition 4
The analysis of the two trivial steady states is analogous to the proof of proposition 3.
Inspection of (33) shows that δ˙ = 0 at δ = 0 and δ = 1. Turning to stability, we have
dδ˙
dδ = λ(1 − δ) [rs(δ)− rm(δ)] − λδ [rs(δ)− rm(δ)] + λδ(1 − δ) [r′s(δ)− r′m(δ)] . At δ = 0,
rs(0) is not defined but limδ→0 dδ˙dδ = limδ→0 [rs(δ)− rm(δ)] → ∞ > 0, so that the first
trivial steady state is locally unstable. At δ = 1, rm(1) is not defined but limδ→1 dδ˙dδ =
limδ→1−[rs(δ)− rm(δ)]→∞ > 0, so that the second trivial steady state is locally unstable.
Let us now to turn to prove stability of the non-trivial steady state. ∀δ ∈ (0, 1) we
have dδ˙/dδ = − λ1+zm
µ0
Ψ δ(1 − δ)
(
zs
Γ(α,s)
α
1
δ2
−+z 1
(1−δ)2
)
< 0. Hence δ∗ = Γ(α,s)Γ(α,s)+zm/zs is
asymptotically stable over δ ∈ (0, 1).
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